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This case discusses the management and control of a large enterprise-wide implementation of an ERP system while the 
business model and corporate culture were shaping and being shaped by that implementation.  In 1995, the Enterprise 
Networks Systems business unit of AT&T faced a triad of problems caused by its legacy IT infrastructure, including the lack 
of timely, accurate financial and operating data, looming Y2K issues and systems capacity issues that were beginning to 
limit growth.  A business plan for change was developed and approved.  A project team was assembled to replace 25 years 
of legacy systems architecture (400+ systems) with a new enterprise systems architecture. The team was to act as change 
agent by supplanting a myriad of business processes and people practices that were seen as impediments to future growth 
and profitability.  This case describes the design, development and deployment of one of the largest ERP implementations. 
The project required the implementation of standardized business processes and people practices for 30,000+ associates 
globally while minimizing the impacts on 1.3 million customers and on shareholders.  Simultaneously, upper management 
set out on a strategy of creating a virtual business by outsourcing major business functions, including IT, Manufacturing and 
Distribution, and major parts of the sales and service operations.  Other major events included the spin-offs of Lucent 
Technologies and Avaya.   
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1. CASE SUMMARY 
 
The Enterprise Network Systems business unit8 of AT&T 
had been through several reincarnations since its inception 
in 1983.  Layers of IT systems technologies had been 
created over the years to support various business 
structures and strategies as the communications industry 
evolved from a regulated monopoly structure to a 
competitive structure, and as the underlying technology 
evolved from analog voice to digital voice to integrated 
voice-data applications.  By 1995, the layers of 
functionally oriented IT systems, which tied the vertically 
integrated, traditionally managed functional structure of 
the business together, were a barrier to the future growth of 
the business and formed a cost floor with a breakeven 
                                                 
8 We use the name Enterprise Networks Systems as the 
business unit precursor to Avaya.   
point that was too high.  The advent of new technologies 
and new types of supplier firms could enable the business 
to focus on those parts of the value chain for which it had a 
comparative advantage, such as R&D, marketing, and sales 
and service.   
 
In 1995, AT&T set up the reengineering team to replace 
the legacy IT infrastructure with a new ERP-enabled one.  
In 1996, Lucent Technologies spun-off from AT&T.  It 
announced the outsourcing of information technologies to 
IBM Global Services, “including management of 
mainframe data centers, much of its systems applications 
maintenance, and provide support for its desktop systems 
worldwide.” (Lucent 1996) This first step of outsourcing 
key functions set the pattern for the future of the integrated 
vertical structure. i.e., business functions that were not 
competitive would be outsourced to firms that were 
considered at the top of their respective industries.  
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The next target Lucent Technologies considered was the 
channel structure of Enterprise Networks Systems.  
Enterprise Networks Systems marketed its products 
through both direct and indirect (dealers and distributors) 
channels.  Approximately 90% of the business was 
conducted through the direct channel with dealers 
providing complementary market coverage.  The U.S. 
direct channel was divided into two major divisions: one 
focused on selling to small business and one selling to 
large businesses.   
 
On April 2, 2000, the small business division spun off to 
Expanets, Inc., a partner entity of NorthWestern 
Corporation (Hersch 2000).  By the mid-1990s, 
technological change had reduced the size of the physical 
product produced and competition had reduced the amount 
of product required from Enterprise Networks Systems 
manufacturing operations.  This left the business unit with 
an aging manufacturing infrastructure and excess capacity.  
On February 20, 2000, it announced a deal to outsource 
manufacturing to Celestica, Inc. (Celestica 2001) 
 
In October 2000, Avaya spun from Lucent Technologies. 
Avaya continued to evaluate various functions and 
outsourced parts or all of real estate management, 
procurement, and much of the remainder of information 
systems.  By October 2001, this left Avaya as a virtual 
company with the key business functions of R&D, 
marketing , services, large company sales, channel 
management, and contract management of the outsourced 
functions.  The glue that now held Avaya together were 
contracts, an integrated enterprise resource planning 
system, and the integrating functionality of the World 
Wide Web.   
 
2. THE GOAL OF THE PROJECT 
 
In 1995, AT&T’s Enterprise Network Systems set out to 
replace 25 years of U.S. IT infrastructure consisting of 
layers of legacy mainframe systems and a spaghetti of 
manufacturing, distribution, sales, services and marketing 
applications that supported the vertically integrated 
business.  A small team, which included IT and several 
business leaders, created a business case and received 
approval by business unit executives in 4Q1995.  The 
business case included the selection of an enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) system from SAP AG, a major 
supplier of ERP solutions.  The approved business case set 
forth the following goal: A team was to transform 
Enterprise Networks Systems by replacing 25 years of U.S. 
business processes, people practices, and enabling systems 
technologies.  They were to replace it with an end-to-end, 
customer-focused value chain that delivers products and 
services on time and at least cost.  The delivery of those 
goods and services was to be based on internal and 
external customer requirements.  The project was to 
achieve cost savings of at least $125M per year.  The 
project was to begin in January 1996 and to be completed 
by September 1999.  Finally, the project was required to 
minimize the disruption of the business units operations.  
The business case did not include the business unit’s 
international operations, certain aspects of the business 
unit’s services operations, or systems supporting the R&D 
community.   
 
The project begun in January 1996 was concluded in 
September 2001.  Over that period, the project had three 
leaders:  1) Ron Joaquim for Phase 1 from January 1996 to 
August 1999; 2) Jim Flinton for Phase 2 from August 1999 
to August 2000; and 3) John Stevenson from August 2000 
to September 2001. 
 
3. STRATEGY AND TACTICS 
 
In 1995, Enterprise Network Systems was comprised of 
35,000+ (SEC 2000, 2001) employees in 90 countries.  It 
sold products and services to a customer base of 1.3 
million customers with 90% of them in the U.S.  
Employees were located at more than 600 sites in the U.S.  
Enterprise Network Systems derived 80% of its revenue 
from U.S. operations.  It manufactured and repaired 
products at three major facilities in the U.S., manufactured 
them at three sites outside of the U.S., and repaired them at 
multiple locations globally. 
 
In January 1996, Ron Joaquim was named Vice President, 
Reengineering, to lead the reengineering effort.  He 
assembled a small planning team to develop a strategy.  
The team included managers from the key business 
functions, including sales, service, manufacturing, market 
management, finance, and human resources.  The business 
chose Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) as the consultant.  
PWC facilitated the design of the strategy, provided the 
initial design methodology and led the initial design effort.  
The team built the reengineering strategy constructed on a 
series of principles. The most important principle and the 
only principle not violated was “One customer, one 
system.” This founding principle drove the strategy.  At its 
highest level the strategy was to convert the products, and 
distribution and manufacturing infrastructure on a 
customer segment basis (small, large, multinational, and 
international customers) and then to convert sales and 
services teams and the customer base associated with each 
segment.   
   
4. BUILDING BLOCKS OF CHANGE 
 
During 1996, Ron and the strategy planning leaders 
established team objectives, assembled teams, built 
requirements, developed an applications architecture 
roadmap, and developed a realization process to configure 
and deploy SAP and the associated architecture.  In 
addition, Ron and the team leaders worked with each of the 
business leaders to gain the necessary functional business 
support.  
 
4.1 Team Objectives 
The existing business processes, people practices and 
legacy systems architecture were generating results that 
were unacceptable to internal operations, customers and 
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shareholders.  For example, integrated operations and 
financial data did not exist.  Only partial operations data 
were available on a real time basis in manufacturing, 
distribution, sales and services. The financial information 
that these operational results drove were not available until 
the end of the third week after the beginning of the next 
month.  Operational effect and financial consequence were 
separated from each other for the business unit and for the 
corporate parent.  Therefore, financial book close was 
manual, slow and fraught with potential errors.  The book 
close process consisted of the reconciliation of data across 
multiple financial and operational systems. In addition, 
25% of large customer make-to-order shipments were 
being shipped incompletely or late.  Of the most complex 
communications orders and all international orders, none 
shipped on time or completely.  
 
An additional inefficiency was the use of a late 1970’s 
vintage product configurator.  The configurator was 
accurate approximately 60% of the time.  The sales team 
used this to configure products for technical assurance and 
to price configurations for customer quotes and orders.  
The root causes of these inaccuracies were incorrect and 
untimely modifications to the configurator during product 
realization updates and introductions and dual material 
coding structures.  The marketing and sales team (and 
therefore customers) used one coding language; and the 
R&D, manufacturing, distribution and services team, a 
different language.  This lack of common product and 
service languages meant the creation of a multitude of code 
translation tables.    The result was that orders seldom 
reflected what the customer ordered, what the factory 
manufactured, what services installed or what the customer 
was billed.  Finally, when a customer called into a service 
center for help, the inconsistency in the coding language 
meant that customer and the customer service agent 
frequently spoke two different languages about which 
products were on the customer’s premise and which ones 
were causing the problem. 
 
From these, and many other problems, the team developed 
objectives.  These included improving the quality and 
accuracy of the quote to cash process, reducing the time to 
configure and process orders, eliminating order rework in 
sales manufacturing, distribution and installation, reducing 
book close time, reducing billing errors, improving 
accounts receivable collections, reducing IT costs, 
reducing services installation time, improving on-time, 
accurate shipping performance. Figure 1 provides the 
targeted enhancements, by stage of the value chain. 
 
The senior leaders assembled teams of key knowledge 
workers from the functional organizations based on their 
knowledge of the business, on their ability to translate 
business requirements into technical requirements, on their 
acceptability to the business community, and their 
willingness to create change. The business teams were 
accountable for developing the future state business 
processes and people practices, converting the 
requirements into technical specifications, configuring and 
testing the SAP software, and deploying the new business 
processes, people practices and enabling technologies to 





























































Figure 2: Reengineering Team Organization Chart:  
1996-1999 
 
The senior leaders assembled teams of key knowledge 
workers from the functional organizations based on their 
knowledge of the business, on their ability to translate 
business requirements into technical requirements, on their 
acceptability to the business community, and their 
willingness to create change. The business teams were 
accountable for developing the future state business 
processes and people practices, converting the 
requirements into technical specifications, configuring and 
testing the SAP software, and deploying the new business 
processes, people practices and enabling technologies to 
their respect business constituencies.    
 
In parallel to the business team, the Information 
Technologies (IT) team leader assembled a team to support 
the business teams, provided the initial, transitional, and 
final state technical architecture, as well as led the design, 
development, testing and deployment of the interfaces 
necessary to enable the transformation and for 
decommissioning the legacy systems.   
 
The leader of the project office acted as the Chief 
Operations Officer for the project.  The project office set 
project management standards including those for the 
standardized realization process and for results reporting, 
developed and coordinated the planning and project 
management of each release of process, people practice 
and systems functionality, and managed the integrated 
meeting process. Each team managed its own timeline 
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within the context of the overall release schedule.  A set of 
daily, weekly, and biweekly team and across teams 
meetings served to integrate and maintain control over the 
project.   
   
4.3 Realization Process  
A standard realization process was established (Figure 3). 
Each of the teams developed a set of business requirements 
from their respective business functions.  The requirements 
teams then developed an integrated value chain by working 
backwards from the customers through the value chain to 
insure that internal inputs and outputs corresponded across 
functions.  This integrated value chain formed the basis for 


























Figure 3: Integrated Release Process 
 
 
4.4 Transformation Of The Core  
The core business was transformed in three releases.  In 
release one, Enterprise Network Systems sales operations 
to small and midsized companies were converted.  The 
business unit serviced over 1.2 million customers in the 
U.S. (including Alaska and Hawaii).  The team chose to 
change out this portion of the business first to improve 
customer satisfaction and profit margins, as well as to test 
and improve the systems realization and change 
management processes.  The large size of the task required 
the conversion of the sales teams and customers in waves 
by region. The data conversion team converted customer 
data from the legacy system to SAP10. Then, the change 
management team worked with the sales channel to insure 
that they could service customers in SAP before moving to 
the next customer set.  The conversion cycle time was from 
2 – 4 months, depending upon: the number of sales 
locations, the size and complexity of the customer base, 
and sales team readiness and willingness for conversion to 
the new processes, people practices and SAP technologies.  
                                                 
                                                
9 This approach did allow the team to get “buy-in” for the 
design; unfortunately, it also leads down the path to mass 
customization of the software. 
10 The data conversion process was recognized as “best 
practice” by SAP due to the detailed step-by-step planning 
and implementation process built by the data conversion 
team 
End to end cycle time for this phase of the project was 16 
months. 
 
In the third year of the project, the team was required to 
modify the structure of SAP and the project (release two) 
to accommodate changes required by Lucent Technologies, 
when it decided to run the business as a holding 
company11.  The existing systems infrastructure made this 
decision difficult to implement and manage and in late 
1997, Lucent Technologies decided to adopt SAP for its 
ERP system.  The planned architecture included an 
umbrella of corporate functions into which the business 
units were simply “plugged in”.  This plug and play 
architecture was to provide the capability to acquire (buy) 
and divest (sell) companies as required by the strategies 
and tactics of the business.  Headquarters and   functional 
teams from each business unit developed requirements for 
finance (Francesco 1998), treasury, procurement, and data 
standards common functions.  Critical planning included 
splitting common business functions between headquarters 
and business units, i.e., which business functions were 
going to be executed in the business units and which 
functions were to be accomplished within Lucent 
Technologies headquarters or both.  Additionally, a new 
data coding structure was developed to insure that there 
was a minimum of data structures within Lucent.   
    
The team integrated a front-end technical product 
configurator by Trilogy, Inc. with SAP and designed a 
realization process by which prices, technical rules and 
product codes were loaded simultaneously in both the new 
architecture and the legacy architecture.  The combination 
of these factors, i.e., the new configurator, new pricing, 
coding and configurator change management process, and 
integration between the Trilogy based configurator and 
SAP, dramatically improved the timeliness and quality of 
the quote to cash process.  The systems design, 
development and deployment cycle time for Release 2 of 
the ERP functionality was 12 months. 
 
In the late 1980s, Enterprise Network Systems had 
converted its large customer, PBX12 manufacturing 
operations to a make-to-order operation based on a fixed 
manufacturing interval.  A series of functional systems, 
which required manual intervention in order to insure order 
quality and timeliness, supported the order process from 
the field sales teams to the Denver manufacturing 
operation and delivery of the order to the customer site.  
Release 3 converted these operations to SAP. This required 
plugging SAP into the existing order flow process and 




11 It acquired some 38 companies between 1996 and 2001. 
12 Private Branch Exchanges (PBX) are voice switches that 
larger businesses require for managing voice traffic within 
a location and to outside communications networks.   
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In preparation for the conversion of the Denver Works 
manufacturing and distribution functions to SAP new 
manufacturing processes were designed to provide for 
flexible order intervals based on customer requirements.  A 
second major step was the conversion of the current coding 
structure to the SAP bill of materials structure.  The team 
chose to flash cut the conversion over a three-day 
weekend.  When the flash cut to the new manufacturing 
processes, people practices and SAP occurred, the project 
team was assigned to supplement the operators and the line 
management to work out problems with the cut.   The 
change management team supported the operations team 
through a 60-day operations change process and in parallel 
worked with the manufacturing management team through 
a 90-day period.  This allowed the team to work out bugs 
in the manufacturing and distribution processes and then to 
streamline the management reporting processes enabled by 
SAP.  In the end, shipping performance improved from 
75% on time and accurate to well over 90%.  Order rework 
before, during and after manufacturing was dramatically 
reduced since manual intervention were eliminated.  The 
team completed the end-to-end realization project in 14 
months.   
 
4.5 Business Transformation 
As 1999 progressed, the pressure to grow revenues was 
increasing as well as the growth of competing business 
requirements for e-enabled business capabilities  A group 
was set up to e-enable the business.  To fund the group, the 
reengineering teams and legacy IT teams were merged and 
the savings gained from combining the two teams was 
used to fund the new e-team. In September 1999, Jim 
Flinton was named as CIO to lead the next phase of the 
project.  As one of the first steps, he restructured the team 
to achieve these goals. The reengineering teams and legacy 
systems IT teams were merged and reconfigured and 
became accountable for the simultaneous design, 
development, configuring, testing, data conversion and 
deployment of multiple releases (Figure 4). In addition, 
each team was now accountable for decommissioning of 
the associated legacy infrastructure.  With the integration 
and the reduction in budget, the structure of the team was  
modified 1) to reduce cost, 2) to improve speed and 3) to 
increase the accountability of the team to the business for 
producing smaller and more frequent deliverables.   
 
On April 2, 2000, Lucent Technology announced that it 
was spinning off its Enterprise Networks Systems business 
unit and a portion of the Networks Systems wire division. 
The new Avaya chairman, Donald Peterson requested an 
estimate of the costs that would be need to complete the 
deployment of SAP and decommissioning of the legacy 
architecture by October 1, 2000, the date the new business 
was to go live.  The team faced a difficult problem since 
SAP was now “middleware” in a legacy systems 
architecture and the team was under pressure to continue to 
manage its cost structure.  The re-configured team 
developed a plan to complete the implementation of the 
new SAP infrastructure by July 2001.  Jim Flinton and the 
team divided the plan into two stages:  Create Avaya and 
complete the ERP.   
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Figure 4:  IT Applications Team Organization Chart:  
2000 – 2001 
 
 
4.6 Creating Avaya 
Avaya required the creation of corporate headquarters 
functions including finance, treasury, human resources, 
procurement, legal, information technologies and public 
relations.  These functions existed at Lucent Technologies 
with satellite functions within each business unit.  The 
team’s new focus was on conversion and deployment of 
existing functionality, and less on creation of new business 
processes and people practices.  The joint business unit and 
Lucent Technologies headquarters team converted finance, 
treasury and procurement functionality from a Lucent 
Technologies version of SAP to an Avaya version of SAP.  
A separate HR IT team converted human resources 
functionality in PeopleSoft to SAPHR. The plan included 
the completion of outsourcing of manufacturing to 
Celestica (Lucent 2000). The end-to-end realization project 
was completed in 6 months, with the exception of HR, 
which required two releases of functionality over 14 
months. 
 
The new headquarters functionality provided the same 
“plug and play” functionality for the new business unit as 
for Lucent Technologies.  Into this new functionality, the 
business integrated both the Enterprise Networks Systems 
and the Connectivity Solutions business units into SAP.  
This presented a problem from a business-reengineering 
standpoint.  The team had installed Enterprise Networks 
Systems functionality on SAP V3.1i of software (which at 
this point looked like middleware rather than an ERP 
system) and had proposed SAP V4.2b for the international 
conversion and for human resources functionality.   The 
team decided to convert Connectivity Solutions to SAP 
V4.2b and set up a standalone version of the business 
processes, people practices and enabling software and 
hardware.  The team completed the end-to-end realization 
project in 6 months going live prior to October 1, 2001.  
The new corporation came into existence on October 1, 
2000.   
 
4.7 Completing the ERP 
The end game consisted of converting the U.S. large 
customer sales and service force and associated customers 
to SAP, converting the International sales and service force 
and International customers, as well as multinational 
customers, and decommissioning the legacy architecture.  
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As part of the transition from Lucent Technologies to 
Avaya, Inc., a new IT organization had to be created to 
manage those functions previously managed by Lucent 
Technologies headquarters functions, including voice and 
data networks, server and mainframe data centers, and 
desktop and laptop access to the new applications.   Jim 
Flinton began that transition and handed off both the 
reengineering project and the new IT functions to a newly 
named CIO, John Stevenson. 
 
As the spin-off from Lucent Technologies was completed 
in October 2000, the team focused on completing the 
conversion of the large customer base and indirect channel 
customers.  This entailed conversion of back office 
operations, sales teams and customer records.  In addition, 
it required the conversion of the offer configurators to the 
new Trilogy configurators. The lessons learned during the 
previous releases were applied and the speed of the 
conversion to SAP was reduced (Avaya 2001). 
 
The original business case did not include conversion of 
non-U.S. operations to SAP, but by 2000, Avaya 
conducted 20% of its business outside of the U.S. in 
approximately 90 countries, with approximately a 60/40 
percentage split between direct and indirect channels. The 
largest share of this business was conducted in Europe and 
the Middle East with the remainder in Asia and the 
Americas (outside of the U.S.).   In addition, it had a series 
of joint ventures in Brazil, India, Mexico and Australia. 
The international business grew by fits and starts 
beginning in the early 1990’s.  Each country and region 
had developed local solutions in country for handling 
finance, ordering, customer care, and international specific 
capabilities for customs and duties.  These local solutions 
were loosely tied to the U.S. systems.  Large customer 
orders were configured manually or through a standalone, 
Trilogy based configurator and then sent to Denver for 
manufacture and shipment.    
 
It was clear that the international business needed to be 
converted.  In order to meet the timeframes required by 
Avaya, a separate standalone team was used to configure 
SAP V4.2b and deploy it to each country. In addition, 
Deloitte and Touche was chosen as the consultant for the 
conversion. Data was converted from a myriad of systems 
ranging from desktop PC applications to server-based 
databases to paper based accounting ledgers.  The design, 
development and deployment began in spring 2000 and 
were completed in August 2002, or approximately 16 
months. 
 
The legacy infrastructure remained virtually intact 
throughout the conversion to the SAP-enabled architecture.  
Some minor systems and a few major manufacturing 
systems were decommissioned over the period 1996 to 
2000, but most of the legacy architecture was still in place.  
Only when all U.S. and International customers had been 
converted, the small business sold off, and manufacturing 
outsourced was Avaya able to decommission the legacy 
structure.   
The planning for the conversion began in the fall of 2000 
when a team consisting of representatives from each group 
supporting the legacy infrastructure and IBM Global 
Services (who actually maintained and supported the 
systems) was assembled.  The team was given the charge 
to decommission the applications and retire or redeploy 
hardware.  For the most part the systems were contained on 
older NCR servers, AT&T 3B servers or IBM mainframes.  
None of which could be reused.  The software was 
decommissioned by the end of September 2001.   
 
In July 2001, the economy was in the second year of a 
recession.  IT costs had dropped dramatically from over 
9% of revenues to under 4.5%.  Revenue forecasts in the 
spring 2001 were not encouraging as buying from the IT 
industry slowed globally.  John Stevenson and the IT 
leadership team knew that the combined Legacy, SAP, 
reengineering and IBM global services teams were more 
than was required to manage the new hardware and 
software infrastructure.  In addition, the team was still 
comprised of business managers (from the original 
reengineering team) and IT professionals.  The future team 
needed to be comprised of IT professionals and a small 
group of business/IT managers to interface with the 
functional leadership for purposes of managing future 
business requirements for IT functionality. 
 
As part of an overall Avaya program, John and the IT 
leadership team adopted a number of retirement, force 
reduction and career management programs. Career 
development programs were developed for the IT 
professionals, and the plans implemented.  One of the 
paths opened up for the IT professional occurred when 
Avaya and IBM expanded their outsourcing relationship to 
include management of the new SAP infrastructure.  A 
large part of the team moved to IBM Global Services 
under that outsourcing arrangement.   
 




The project that began in the 4th quarter of 1995 ended in 
August 2001, two years overdue and at an additional cost 
of more than $175 million.  At a minimum, it did achieve 
its goal of saving $125 million a year.  The project 
replaced 25 years of business processes, people practices 
and legacy systems and applications.  It improved Quote to 
Cash speed and reduced cycle time from 3 in 4 customer 
orders configured, ordered, shipped, installed and billed 
accurately on time to 19 out of 20.  Order processing speed 
was reduced to minutes from days.  At least $20 million in 
annual order rework was eliminated.  Offer realization time 
was reduced.   
 
The project team achieved end-to-end data visibility. This 
alone enabled real time and fast end of period book close 
(from more than 8 days down to a few days) and provided 
real time financial results based on operational effect 
versus pre-conversion book close data which was delivered 
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three weeks after the end of the month.  In addition, 
managers at all level of the enterprise had access to 
operational data and customer visibility for the first time. 
Lucent Technologies Press Release [2000], “Northwestern 
Corporation’s Expanets division buys U.S. small and 
mid-sized business sales group from Lucent 
Technologies.”   
The new architecture was structured around a few primary 
vendor products, including SAP, Trilogy, and Seibel  
There were now standard global business processes and 
global people processes.  The technological structure could 
be upgraded as the business strategy evolved. 
Celestica Press Release [2001], “Celestica Announces Five 
Year U.S. $4 Billion Global Strategic Alliance with 
Avaya.”  
SEC 10K405 Report [2001], Commission File Number 
001-15951. 
 SEC 10K Report [2002], Commission File Number 001-
15951. There were some unintended consequences. As the firm 
spun off from Lucent Technologies, it became clear that 
the infrastructure of mainframe and server data centers, 
desktop and laptop PCs, hotline support, and applications 
support was unnecessarily too high (approximately 9+% of 
revenue in 1999) and the new applications structure 
required a far simpler IT infrastructure and resulted in 
lower IT costs.  In addition, the new architecture enabled 
the construction of an e-customer, e-supplier, and e-
associate based backbone and provided a modular business 
model to support future acquisitions or divestitures and to 
in-source or outsource business functions as required by 
the needs of the business.  Finally, the streamlining of the 
infrastructure eliminated the internal handoffs and quality 
checks required of a functionally based process and 
systems architecture. This final step has provided the basis 
by which Avaya’s breakeven point has been reduced to 
$1.075 billion (Avaya 2003).  
Francesco, Thomas A [1998], Transforming Lucent’s 
CFO.” Strategic Finance. 
Avaya Communications [2001], “Avaya System 
Conversion to SAP: Important Message to Enterprise 
Voice and Octel Messaging Business Partners.”  
Avaya, Inc. Press Release [2003], “Avaya Reports First 
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Among the lessons learned were: 
 
1)  The “One customer, One system” principle required 
that both the Legacy and the ERP architectures remain in 
place until the last customers were converted to SAP, thus 
prolonging the cost and complexity of the reengineering 
effort.    
2) Focus on data integrity and control of changes during 
the customer conversion were keys to successful 
conversion.   
 3)  Who ever has the knowledge of the problem has the 
lead regardless of level in the organization.   Lauren B. Eder is an Associate Professor of Computer 
Information Systems at Rider 
University. She received her 
Ph.D. and MBA in 
Management Information 
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University. Her research has 
been published in 
Communications of the ACM, 
Computer Personnel, Omega, 
and Information Resources 
Management Journal, among other journals. She is editor 
of Managing Healthcare Information Systems with Web-
Enabled Technologies, Idea Group Publishing (2000).  
4)  The initial business team structure and resulting 
business requirements caused the initial projects to require 
mass customization and slowed the project down.   
5)   Only the CEO can enforce a “no customization” rule.  
6)  The project was only completed when the integrated IT 
team used off-the-shelf software and functionality.   
7)  The real world waits for no team.  Expect major 
changes to the business model and expect to have to 
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